The practice of American prisons to shackle and otherwise restrain incarcerated, pregnant women is problematic for several reasons. Such practices include shackling, chaining, and handcuffing pregnant inmates during their third trimester, transportation to and from medical facilities, labor and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Current discourse on this topic focuses primarily on how these practices invade the woman's civil liberties, particularly the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and international human rights. Recent case law vindicates policy rationales for such practices-safety of others, safety of the woman herself, and securing flight risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1977 and 2004, the number of incarcerated females in the United States increased by 757%, 1 primarily as a result of "the socalled war on drugs and related changes in legislation, law enforcement practices, and judicial decision-making."
2 This increase was not a result of an upsurge in violence perpetrated by American women.
Increasing female prison 3 populations heightens a related, genderspecific concern: how the pregnant prison population is treated while incarcerated. In 2009, it was reported that, "at any given time, more than 10,000 pregnant women are" incarcerated. 4 In other terms, a 2013 report indicated that 6% of the incarcerated female population is pregnant. 5 It is unclear whether this incarcerated, pregnant population is comprised of women who enter prison pregnant 6 or become pregnant in prison. 7 Sexual abuse by prison guards has been an endemic issue in American prisons for decades, 8 so it is possible that an inmate may become pregnant while incarcerated as a result of such abuse. 9 On the other hand, recent legislative and executive focus on prosecuting pregnant women who use illegal substances or abuse legal substances would, of course, contribute to the increased pregnant prison population. 10 Nevertheless, the number of pregnant women who are incarcerated in the United States is significant.
The problem is not that this population exists, but instead how pregnant women in American correctional institutions are treated-an essentially barbaric practice. Women are being chained and shackled during their third trimester, labor and delivery, 11 and postpartum recovery. 12 States justify these practices as safety precautions for society, the authorities, and the woman herself. However, this Note dispels these alleged safety concerns and presents a new perspective on why these policies should be banned, as suggested by recent federal legislation.
Rather than focusing on the incarcerated mother's rights, 13 this Note shifts the focus to the fetus and, thereafter, child by applying (1) abortion jurisprudence when discussing the fetus and (2) constitutional law and child custody principles to protect the child, once born. Based on the reasoning presented herein, each state should enact legislation to ban the restraint-shackling, abdominal-chaining, and 16 and their progeny-to establish that the state has an interest in protecting the fetus being carried by an incarcerated, pregnant woman. Part III then argues that once the child is born, or the time-period shifts from the third trimester to labor and delivery, an independent, constitutionally protected individual exists, which requires banning restraints during labor and delivery. Part III also applies the statutory best interests framework, which is at the center of child custody disputes, to emphasize how restraining a pregnant inmate undermines the state's interest in protecting the child. Part IV recommends the enactment of nation-wide legislation mirroring policies purportedly applied by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
II. PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE CURRENT U.S. PRISON SYSTEM
That incarcerated women are shackled, chained, and handcuffed in prison during some of the most physically taxing times of their pregnancy is a reality of which many unimprisoned Americans are unaware. 17 Yet, related topics like women's access to reproductive carecontraception, 18 This Part first explains the current environment in which pregnant women who are incarcerated live and the governmental rationale for the surrounding policies. It then samples related state legislation from across the country and summarizes recent efforts challenging shackling practices on the basis of constitutional and international human rights. This informative Part sets the stage of the current discourse for the shift in discussion that Part III introduces.
A. How Incarceration Limits a Woman's Access to Care
Women compose an increasing proportion of the American prison population; 21 and, approximately 6% of the female prison population is pregnant.
22 Pregnancy in prison is much different than being pregnant in 'free' society. When an incarcerated woman is pregnant, her options as to how her pregnancy will proceed are severely limited by her incarceration and the prison facility's resulting control over her medical care. 23 In contrast, a 'free' woman may completely control her pregnancy, including whether the pregnancy will be carried to term, which doctor treats her, how and where she will give birth, how and where she will recover from labor and delivery, etc.
"An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his [or her] medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met."
24
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it is "the government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration."
25 When medical care is denied, the result is, at least, "pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose."
26 At its worse, such denial of medical care could amount to a vio- to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 34 In fact, "a significant proportion of [correctional] facilities refuse to allow abortion access" to inmates. 35 Even facilities that, in theory, allow inmates to choose an abortion fail to assist women in actually accessing abortions, further undermining the reality that incarcerated women can exercise their fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. 36 As a result, incarcerated women are essentially forced to carry their pregnancies to term. 37 One scholar, in particular, drawing from international human rights standards "argues that the denial of an abortion to an incarcerated woman should constitute torture and a violation of the Eighth Amendment." 38 
B. Chained and Shackled by American Correctional Institutions
In addition to a general lack of medical care and severely restricted access to abortion, 42 pregnant inmates in U.S. correctional facilities are often physically restrained during the third trimester, 43 transportation to and from medical facilities, labor and delivery, 44 and postpartum recovery. 45 Yet, "[a]t least two courts have held that pregnancy, at least in its later stages, constitutes a serious medical need,"
46 indicating that medical care may not be denied to inmates under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 47 In Illinois, the pioneer in anti-shackling legislation-as explained in Section 1 below-defines "restraints" as:
[A]ny physical restraint or mechanical device used to control the movement of a prisoner's body or limbs, or both, including, but not limited to, flex cuffs, soft restraints, hard metal handcuffs, a black box, Chubb cuffs, leg irons, belly chains, a security (tether) chain, or a convex shield, or shackles of any kind. [T]he period of time before a birth and shall include any medical condition in which a woman is sent or brought to the hospital for the purpose of delivering her baby. These situations include: induction of labor, prodromal labor, pre-term labor, prelabor rupture of membranes, the 3 stages of active labor, uterine hemorrhage during the third trimester of pregnancy, and caesarian delivery including pre-operative preparation. Generally, when such policies exist without restrictive legislation, these restraints are used "regardless of [the woman's] history of violence or escape," 49 meaning the practices are uniformly applied without consideration of case-by-case necessity or appropriateness. This Section further explains existing shackling practices, 50 the policy rationales supporting these practices, and current legislation aiming to reduce such practices-the effectiveness of which may be doubtful.
Security is the central tenant of pro-shackling contentions. Likely the most broadly accepted rationale for shackling practices is that they protect third parties-the public, health professionals, and guardsfrom the woman when she is outside of the correctional facility for medical treatment. 51 For example, when a woman is transported to the hospital to give birth, advocates would say shackling is necessary to ensure the safety of those with whom she may come in contact.
52 Likewise, shackling and chaining pregnant women allegedly ensures that the woman will not escape, which would pose harm to society and the woman herself. 53 To that end, shackling also allegedly protects the pregnant woman from harming herself. In essence, prison "administrators will not lose sight of the fact that some of the imprisoned women are dangerous criminals . . .," which, to them, generally justifies these practices. 50. An entirely separate discussion could be had on the history and locality of shackling practices. Briefly, are traditionally conservative institutes more apt to have these policies in place because they have historically minimized women's rights; or, are they less likely to have these policies due to their strong opposition to abortion and support of fetal protection?
See 54. CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis added).
Current Policies on Shackling and Chaining
Until recently, neither federal nor state legislation was concerned with the physical well-being of imprisoned women. 55 Since then, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) has promulgated restrictive policies on shackling practices; some states have enacted restrictive legislation; and organizations have set suggestive standards limiting the use of these restraints. This Sub-Section describes those efforts and expounds upon their effect.
(a) Federal Policy
In 2008, the FBP banned the "shackling of pregnant prisoners absent extenuating circumstances." 56 This federal policy change requires all states to "follow the same federal policies regarding incarcerated pregnant women."
57 The FBP's report stated "that no restraints may be used on a pregnant prisoner unless there is a risk of escape or a threat that the prisoner will cause harm to herself or staff." 58 The FBP also allowed an exception for "extremely violent prisoner [s] ," who may be restrained so long as the measures used are the least restrictive. 59 The FBP also banned any use of control belts-"a device that administers an electrical shock when triggered"-on pregnant women. 60 This federal legislation sends a strong message on the seriousness of shackling; however, the practical effectiveness of this federal legislation is minimal.
61
Due to fundamental federalism concerns and the Tenth Amendment, direct control of prison operations and policies is indefinitely localized. 62 As an issue of health and safety, prison management and health concerns therein are a matter of state police power in which the federal government may not dip its toe. 63 Notwithstanding any other statute, directive, or administrative regulation, when a pregnant female prisoner is brought to a hospital from a County Department of Corrections facility for the purpose of delivering her baby, no handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind may be used during her transport to a medical facility for the purpose of delivering her baby. Under no circumstances may leg irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on any pregnant female prisoner who is in labor. Upon the pregnant female prisoner's entry to the hospital delivery room, a county correctional officer must be posted immediately outside the delivery room. The Sheriff must provide for adequate personnel to monitor the pregnant female prisoner [Vol. 44:851 during her transport to and from the hospital and during her stay at the hospital.
69
In 2012, Florida enacted its Healthy Pregnancies for Incarcerated Women Act. 70 This Act proscribes the use of restraints "on a prisoner who is known to be pregnant during labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery, unless the corrections official makes an individualized determination that the prisoner presents an extraordinary circumstance." 71 Even in the excusable "extraordinary circumstance," however, "leg, ankle, or waist restraints [cannot] be used on any pregnant prisoner who is in labor or delivery."
72 When the exception of "extraordinary circumstance[s]" is invoked, Florida requires that restraints be "applied . . . in the least restrictive manner necessary," and the officer invoking the exception "shall make written findings . . . as to the extraordinary circumstance that dictated the use of the restraints." 73 Florida also requires that shackling policies be posted in correctional facilities so that inmates are aware of the practices.
74
Minnesota is a state with a more rehabilitative focus, 75 and its shackling policies seem to reflect such disposition. Minnesota's statute is similar to Florida's and provides an exception to its ban of restraints for specific circumstances and requires "the least restrictive [means] available and the most reasonable [restraints] under the circumstances" when the exception is invoked. 76 It also seems to clarify, or expand upon, Florida's vague "extraordinary circumstance" language, providing that "a woman known to be pregnant" cannot be restrained "unless the representative makes an individualized determination that restraints are reasonably necessary for the legitimate safety and security needs of the woman, correctional staff, other inmates, or the public." 77 Note the consistency here with the policy rationales for these practices in general, i.e., protecting third parties who may come in contact with the woman. birth within the preceding three days-referred to as postpartum-
78
Minnesota law provides that restraints may only be used if:
(1) there is a substantial flight risk or some other extraordinary medical or security circumstance that dictates restraints be used to ensure the safety and security of the woman, the staff of the correctional or medical facility, other inmates, or the public;
(2) the [correctional facility] representative has made an individualized determination that restrains are necessary to prevent escape or injury;
(3) there is no objection from the treating medical care provider; and (4) the restrains used are the least restrictive type and are used in the least restrictive manner.
79
Minnesota also addresses another aspect of shackling concerns that is seemingly absent from Florida's statute: the transportation of pregnant inmates. Minnesota limits restraints during transportation, specifically prohibiting restraints that "cross or otherwise touch the woman's abdomen" and any type of wrist restraint that is "affixed behind the woman's back."
80 Also, Minnesota goes further than Florida's notice requirement and requires that facility staff be trained on these statutory provisions.
81
As of August 2013, eighteen states had laws limiting the restraint of pregnant inmates; twenty-four states had less formal policies limiting the restraint of pregnant inmates; and, eight states did not have any form of regulation on the restraint of pregnant inmates.
(c) Organizational Standards
Shackling is also an organizational concern, and organizations like the American Bar Association (ABA) signal to the states by promulgating standards to suggest appropriate legislation or restrictions. The ABA weighed in on the shackling discussion, setting the following related standards: [Vol. 44:851
has recently delivered a baby should be medically appropriate; correctional authorities should consult with health care staff to ensure that restraints do not compromise the pregnancy or the prisoner's health.
(b) . . . . A prisoner should not be restrained while she is in labor, including during transport, except in extraordinary circumstances after an individualized finding that security requires restraint, in which event correctional and health care staff should cooperate to use the least restrictive restraints necessary for security, which should not interfere with the prisoner's labor.
(c) Governmental authorities should facilitate access to abortion services for a prisoner who decides to exercise her right to an abortion, as that right is defined by state and federal law . . . . . . . .
(e) . . . . Governmental authorities should ordinarily allow a prisoner who gives birth while in a correctional facility or who already has an infant at the time she is admitted to a correctional facility to keep the infant with her for a reasonable time, preferably on extended furlough or in an appropriate community facility or, if that is not practicable or reasonable, in a nursery at a correctional facility that is staffed by qualified persons. Governmental authorities should provide appropriate health care to children in such facilities.
(f) If long-term imprisonment is anticipated, a prisoner with an infant should be helped to develop necessary plans for alternative care for the infant following the period described in subdivision (e) of this Standard, in coordination with social service agencies. A prisoner should be informed of the consequences for the prisoner's parental rights of any arrangements contemplated. When a prisoner and infant are separated, the prisoner should be provided with counseling and other mental health support. 83 These standards from the ABA seem to be the most protective, as compared to the FBP's policies and state legislation. First, the ABA starts with providing the inmate the option to terminate the pregnancy by directing access to abortion. 84 Proceeding through gestation, the ABA's standards restricting shackling or other physical restraints cover all three time periods-third trimester (albeit the entire pregnancy), labor and delivery, and postpartum-and also explicitly provide for transportation during these times. The ABA standards also include a notice provision, 85 like that in Florida's statute. 86 Most significantly, the ABA standards provide the most deference to medical professionals and direct the most restrictive usage of such restraints when the narrow exception for "extraordinary circumstances" is invoked. 87 Further, they recognize the importance of the postpartum period and direct that the mother and infant not be separated "for a reasonable time."
88 These ABA-promulgated standards appear to be the most comprehensive step toward protecting incarcerated, pregnant females from the detrimental effects of shackling practices. 
Efforts to Reduce or Ban Shackling and Relevant Case Law
Likewise, the treatment of pregnant, incarcerated women in American correctional institutions has been recently contemplated by interest group efforts, scholarship, and court actions. Current movements look to the following authorities to advocate for the repeal of shackling practices: international human rights standards, such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the U.S. Constitution, specifically the Eighth Amendment.
90
The international human rights approach draws upon fundamental understandings of basic human rights, particularly the principles that (1) all humans, regardless of incarceration, must be treated with dignity and respect and (2) torture or cruel punishment are prohibited.
91
These are the same arguments advanced against using torture in the War on Terror. Organizations like the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School and the ACLU National Prison Project argue that shackling practices violate these inalienable human rights. 92 The international human rights community recognized this concern in 2006 when the Human Rights Committee ("Committee") raised questions about reconciling shackling practices within the context of the guarantees of the ICCPR. Regardless of the legitimacy of this international human rights argument, achieving change via international authority is inherently difficult. 94 The United States has a history of denying responsibility under international norms in varying contexts or denying the authority of international documents. 95 Likewise, the United States' response to the Committee's concerns has been to point to existing legislationfederal and state-that conforms to the ICCPR. 96 Existing legislation is incomplete, though. Some states completely lack legislation addressing these concerns. The goal should be to create uniform standards or legislation to ensure that all states are in conformance with the demands of international human rights. 97 The Eighth Amendment approach argues that shackling practices amount to "cruel and unusual punishment[]."
98 These claims are reviewed under the "deliberate indifference" standard, which is comprised of conjunctive objective and subjective elements, 99 whereby an official must demonstrate "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury." 100 First, the objective element requires that "a detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that such a risk is one that society chooses not to tolerate." 101 In other words, if society feels sufficiently threatened by an unrestrained inmate, shackling is objectively justified. Next, the subjective element requires proving that the officer had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind." There, the Plaintiff, who was pregnant while incarcerated for the nonviolent crime of credit fraud, was shackled to her wheel chair while experiencing medical pains and then shackled to the bed during labor. 105 The Eighth Circuit found that the security officer imposing these restrictions acted with deliberate indifference (discussed below) in using these restraints, with the shackling amounting to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
106
In 2013, in Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 107 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again applied the "deliberate indifference" standard, analyzing whether instances of shackling are unconstitutional. 108 Though ultimately reversing summary judgment for the Plaintiff (inmate) due to factual disputes, 109 the Sixth Circuit established that "the shackling of pregnant detainees while in labor offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'-i.e., it poses a substantial risk of serious harm." 110 The court made clear that "shackling women during labor runs afoul of the protections of the Eighth Amendment" of the U.S. Constitution. 111 However, the Court observed that "the right to be free from shackling during labor is not unqualified."
112
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed previously established exceptions to allow such 'unconstitutional' restraint when the pregnant inmate "presents a danger to herself or others," or "poses a flight risk."
113 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth, vindicated the policy rationales for shackling in the first place. The subjective element allowed the Court to excuse an officer for not removing restraints, despite a "no restraint order" from the hospital, because there was no proof that the officer himself was aware of the order.
114
These practices and the remaining loopholes in the regulations show that even at her most tender and intimate life-stage-child birth-a woman is viewed and treated like a monster, or sub-human, in American institutions. 115 Anti-shackling arguments, explained above, generally focus on the mother's rights; if any discussion centers on the fetus or child, it is a general notion of the medical effects borne by the fetus or child as a result of the restraints. The rationale may be that a fetus does not have rights under the Constitution, and so it seems more obvious and advantageous to focus on the mother. 116 Biologically inherent in this conversation, though often overlooked, is another human being: the child who enters the world at a time when shackling is still employed.
117
What previous and developing arguments fail to adequately consider is that shackling is increasingly problematic when the fetus becomes a child. To that end, in all time periods discussed here, the fetus is one that will be carried to term, thereby distinguishing this issue from abortion, through which the fetus will not be carried to term and does not reach the second point of the shackling discussion-labor and delivery. We know that this discussion is different based on prisons' efforts to undermine female inmates' access to abortion.
118
This Part first explains the detrimental effects shackling has on the mother, the fetus, and the child. Section B then sets up the argument that banning shackling would protect the fetus-for which the state has accepted responsibility upon viability in the abortion context-and the child by discussing the state's interests involved in shackling. Section C bolsters the state's interests against shackling by dispelling the purported safety policy justifications behind shackling. Assembling this discussion, Section D contends that shackling practices are unconstitutional when viewed in light of the state's interests in protecting potential fetal life-the full gestation of which is almost guaranteed in this context-and the child's individual, untampered constitutional rights as a "person" under the U.S. Constitution, independent from its incarcerated mother.
116. But cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining efforts in Alabama to recognize fetal interests).
117. Note this is distinguishable and non-transferable to abortion discourse wherein the fetus is never intended to be born and remains a fetus rather than a child.
118. See supra discussion Section II.A.
A. Detrimental Effects of Shackling "[T]he justifications for shackling pale in comparison to the severe damage and degradation it causes." 119 The effects of shackling on the mother are an obvious concern, especially considering that incarcerated women are generally "treated less well than men while their gender-specific needs have been ignored."
120 Few things are more gender specific than pregnancy and childbirth, 121 not to mention the emotional intensity of the childbearing process, which is increased not only by incarceration but also the use of these barbaric devices.
122 Shackling the mother during labor and delivery inherently complicates these intimate and life-changing processes and poses risk to the infant.
123
Directly affecting the mother and the fetus, restraints interfere with the mother's balance. 124 When restrained, it is more likely that the mother will lose her balance and fall, risking injury to the fetus "because of [the mother's] inability to catch herself" when handcuffed. 125 Florida's statute directly addresses this concern, providing that "[i]f wrist restraints are used [in the third trimester], they must be applied in the front so the pregnant prisoner is able to protect herself in the event of a forward fall." 126 Inherent in the word "restraint" is the fact that using shackles, handcuffs, and chains on a pregnant woman during labor and delivery complicates these processes. Specifically, the woman's movement is restricted, lessening her ability to change positions as necessary. 127 For example, in Nelson (the Eighth Circuit case discussed above), the mother/inmate "suffered a hip dislocation and an umbilical hernia directly resulting from the shackles that prevented" her from moving her legs. 128 Medical personnel are also restricted in their access to the mother and fetus during delivery, which may jeopardize the safety of 122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 ("The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear."); Goldberg, supra note 124. E.g., Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. 125. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131; accord Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. the child. 129 Especially in an emergency situation, restricting medical personnel could cause physical harm to the child. 130 In fact, even a minor delay could cause "permanent brain damage to the child."
131
In conclusion, the risks posed by using restraints on pregnant inmates outweigh any possible benefit these practices could serve. Specifically, these practices pose medical, physical, and emotional risks to the mother and fetus/infant/child. Thus, pregnancy is itself an extraordinary circumstance that repudiates the use of shackles, handcuffs, or other restraints on pregnant inmates.
B. The State's Interests
When considering almost any legislation, two sides are almost always involved. Here, the two interests to review are (1) the state's interests in enacting the legislation and (2) the interests of those affected by the legislation. This is the fundamental structure of American constitutional law, regardless of the level of review being applied. With respect to shackling, when analyzing these interests, the focus has been on the woman-the state's interest in protecting society from an inmate who may be dangerous, and the woman's interest in maintaining her bodily autonomy consistent with the right against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
132
This discussion shifts the analysis to the fetus and child who is also affected by shackling practices. Directly transposing abortion jurisprudence shows that the state's interests in protecting potential human life and fetal dignity are not unique to the abortion context and may be even stronger in this context where the state acts to essentially ensure that the fetus is delivered. Then, upon birth, the analysis shifts to view the interests in light of an innocent, newborn infant with unfettered rights, which the state has an interest in protecting.
Regarding an inmate's ability to choose abortion, "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child." access to abortion. 134 Rather, this discussion functions within the current abortion framework that recognizes state interests in protecting fetal life, to a certain extent. Then, the focus shifts to the constitutionally protected citizen once the child is born. To contextualize this discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade stated:
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. 135 It goes without saying that there are glaring discrepancies between this language and what is happening to incarcerated women and the children born to them. This Section illustrates the state's interests in shackling, first during gestation as it relates to potential fetal life, and second, after birth as it relates to the child.
Protecting Fetal Health-A State Interest Vindicated by Abortion Law
The U.S. Supreme Court increasingly recognizes and upholds the state's interests in protecting a fetus as gestation progresses. 136 give birth. If anything, the difference is that the latter will certainly be delivered. Thus, the state's recognized interests in protecting fetal life must also apply when discussing incarcerated pregnancy.
Yet, such interests are directly contradicted by the enactment and implementation of shackling practices. Under the Casey "undue burden" framework, the state emphasizes its interest in protecting both the mental health of the woman and the health of the fetus once it reaches viability. 140 Viability is "the point at which a fetus could potentially live outside the mother's womb without medical aid." 141 
Casey
suggests that the state's interests are valid before the child is born.
142
While this may differ from the wishes of some abortion advocates, for now, this is the current framework-women have the right to choose without any substantial obstacle until the state's interests become significant enough to be involved in the consideration. 143 Living in the Casey framework, the state should not be allowed to abandon its responsibility to the fetus simply because the mother is incarcerated. In sum, shackling incarcerated women undercuts the state's purported interests in fetal wellbeing, the fundamental premise of the Casey "undue burden" framework. who will raise the child on her own. 159 With that, the interests of the child who will be permanently disconnected from its incarcerated mother become individually more significant. Switching to the state's focus on the parents rather than the child: The child's new parentsfoster, adoptive, or the state-have an interest in the child being taken care of, or protected, by the state until the child reaches their care.
160
C. Empirically Dispelling Security Concerns-Escape, Harm to Herself, Harm to Others
The security rationales for shackling have been empirically refuted. First, women are primarily incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, such as drug use. 161 So, women inmates generally do not have violent dispositions and have not shown a propensity for violence. 162 In fact, some academics propose the exact opposite: that the prison population is comprised of victims rather than people who cause harm to others. 163 Thus, the idea that these women, especially when pregnant and nearing the most enduring part of their pregnancy, pose a risk to those around them is based on false pretenses.
Further, even if they were dangerous, these women, and inmates in general, do not enter medical facilities at their leisure. Shackling and chaining policies demonstrate this point in the extreme. Instead, in addition to physical restraints, inmates are usually escorted by officers who stay with the inmate throughout treatment. 164 Thus, if a woman attempted to escape, despite the argument above, she would be stopped by the guard-rendering shackling/chaining essentially superfluous and merely punitive, if anything. In states that have eliminated or significantly limited shackling/chaining practices, no escapes of incarcerated, pregnant women have been reported. 165 This is intuitively sound; a woman enduring child birth is unlikely to muster the energy or ability to escape a medical facility. Even if she could escape, why would she? She needs medical care to deliver her child and recover from child birth. Assumedly, a woman would not 159. Cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining how Alabama basically used this interest as leverage to stop the incarcerated woman from having an abortion by moving to terminate her parental rights). think it is in the best interests of her child or herself to escape a medical facility and confront the burden and risk of child birth alone. Further, escaping prison is generally disadvantageous to the woman and almost always results in re-incarceration. 166 Similarly, the idea that a woman poses a security risk to herself significantly lacks empirical support. In Florida, for example, there were only six suicides among incarcerated women-pregnant and non-pregnant-between 2000 and 2015. 167 For the same time period, there were 119 male suicides.
168
Consolidating and contextualizing this disproval of security concerns within a constitutional analysis, we see that shackling and chaining policies are unconstitutional. While the state's security concerns are barely valid, even with a valid security concern, the policies are not narrowly tailored to address these concerns. 169 The next Section discusses further the unconstitutionality of these policies within the context of the state's interests in protecting fetal rights-as outlined in the abortion framework-and the child's rights-as outlined by the Constitution and child custody laws.
D. Why Shackling the Mother Is Unconstitutional-The Child's Rights and State's Interest in Fetal Life
When a newborn is delivered, the child is no longer a fetus and becomes a 'person' of its own right to protection under the U.S. Constitution. With such embodiment comes civil liberties and undeniable human rights. Stated another way, the child is an individual separate from the mother with its own rights. The child custody context illustrates this principle, in which the system considers and compares the child's rights juxtaposed with the parents' rights. At times, infants, toddlers, and children of all ages are separated from their parents to protect the child's interests; 170 as mentioned above, such is the case for many children of incarcerated parents.
171
Shackling supporters "argue that the shackling of women during labor is not inhumane because these women are prisoners."
172 No matter the crime for which the mother is sentenced, though, the child has not committed any crime. 173 Thus, the rights of the newborn child must be protected, despite any loss of civil liberties by the mother 174 via incarceration that may support the rhetoric for keeping shackling practices intact.
175 This Section addresses the fetus's and then the child's rights throughout the most problematic periods in which female inmates are being restrained-the third trimester of pregnancy, labor and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Underlying this entire discussion is the notion that the only pregnancies which are relevant here are those that will be carried to term-due either to the mother's choice to have her child or her inability to access an abortion due to the prison facility's control. This becomes the basis for the argument that shackling is unconstitutional for reasons other than the rights of the mother and why states implementing or allowing shackling practices are neglecting their interests assumed in other arenas, such as abortion. 176 Despite the fact that shackling practices have "been around for at least 176. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (stating that the state has an "important and legitimate interest in potential life" at viability "because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb"). a century [,] . . . the law on the shackling of pregnant women is underdeveloped," 177 and history's acceptance does not dictate that these modernly repulsive practices be allowed. The third trimester of a pregnancy includes weeks twenty-seven through forty of gestation. 179 "Gestation" is "the development of a human embryo or fetus between fertilization and birth."
180 At thirty-eight weeks, "the fetus is considered full term." 181 The third trimester is significant, especially within the context of the current abortion framework, as the time-frame in which the fetus reaches viability.
182 As explained above, viability is the point at which the state's interests in fetal life become concrete and protectable by acceptable legislation.
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court banned abortion during the third trimester (unless necessary for the mother's health), finding that the state's interests in protecting fetal life outweighed the mother's privacy interests at that point. 183 The Court stated:
Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail.
. . .
In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the restraints during the third trimester of an incarcerated women's pregnancy because it undermines the dignity and safety of fetal life after viability, 195 as understood in current abortion jurisprudence.
Labor and Delivery
"Labor is the process by which the fetus and the placenta leave the uterus." 196 There are three stages of labor that may "begin weeks before a woman delivers her infant." 197 The final stage of labor "begins with the birth [of the infant] and ends with the completed delivery of the placenta and afterbirth."
198 This stage, thus, invokes the constitutionally significant birth. As discussed above, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have determined that shackling practices during labor and delivery are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Beginning with the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the applicability of any 'exception,' which is empirically rare, 200 society does not tolerate harm to innocent infants. In fact, much of society-expressed vehemently by the pro-life movement-disavows negative treatment of a fetus, which is not even constitutionally protected. Relating back to the "deliberate indifference" standard applied in the Nelson and Villegas cases explained above, 201 there are two prongs to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Subjectively, regardless of official notice, the harm being caused, or the significantly increased likelihood of harm, to an infant born by a restrained mother seems quite apparent. benefit the child by maintaining and preserving the mother's physical and emotional well-being and allowing the necessary biological development.
IV. CONCLUSION
A newborn is minutes old; its entire life lies ahead. Such life can either be cloaked in innocence, as the " 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law' " would suggest; 218 or, it can be immediately tainted with an environment of unnecessary punishment, likely imposing physical and emotional difficulties. Fetal life, or the state's interests in protecting the same, and the subsequent, more substantial, interests of the child born to an incarcerated woman render unconstitutional shackling and other restraints of pregnant, incarcerated women.
Current shackling discourse generally underemphasizes these interests, which are supplemented by both the mother's and the child's human rights to dignity, respect, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment. This Note brings those interests, unfettered by incarceration, to the forefront, presenting a likely more universally acceptable rationale for following the precedent set by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and American Bar Association for severely restricting the use of physical restraints on pregnant inmates in American correctional facilities to protect the resulting children. 219. Recognizing the effects shackling practices have on both incarcerated women and the children they bear unveils a significant need for uniformity in anti-shackling legislation. Across-the-board legislation is the first step. State-wide legislation can only ensure protection to a certain extent due to the localization of prison management. Enforcement of restrictive legislation, including oversight at the local level, is the ultimate end-goal to ensure that pregnant inmates and their children are protected.
